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The Behaviour of Interest Rate Spreads Prior to and After the Financial Crisis:
Evidence across OECD countries
Abstract
This study investigates the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on interest rate spreads
across OECD countries, using a number of panel methodological approaches, over the 1990-
2015 period. We examine the differential impact of the global financial crisis on interest rate
spreads by dividing the sample period into two, i.e. the period prior to and after the crisis.
Having identified and estimated the impact of a number of drivers on interest rate spreads, the
findings  document  that  after  the  2008  financial  crisis,  the  sensitivity  of  spreads  to  its
determinants turn out to be statistically significant and incorporate credit  risk to a greater
extent. The findings survive a number of robustness checks. The policy implications of the
empirical findings are also discussed.
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1. Introduction
Interest rate spreads, or the difference between lending and borrowing rates, are important
indicators  of  banking  system  efficiency.  Wide  interest  rate  spreads  discourage  savings
through low interest rates on deposits, while they restrict lending for investment. This in turn,
can adversely affect economic growth. The potential dangers of rising interest rate spreads
have received greater attention following the 2008 financial crisis. In the past, economists
believed that widening interest rate spreads were a problem only confronted by developing
countries, because these countries did not possess appropriate regulations and frameworks
governing the operation of their banking system (Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000, Hanson and
De Resende Rocha, 1986). The financial crisis, however, documented that high interest rate
spreads was not only a problem faced by developing, but also by developed economies. The
spreads for example, rose rapidly in the U.S., the U.K. and Europe in the period after the
crisis (Taylor and Williams, 2009).
           The present study extends the literature by exploring for the first time, whether the
factors  that  drive  interest  rate  spreads  have  changed  after  the  2008 financial  crisis.  The
analysis makes use of a sample across OECD countries, given that these countries, especially,
the U.S and Europe, were those that were worst hit by this crisis event. Low borrowing rates
between 2003–2006, accompanied by capital inflows and new banking products which led to
the credit boom in the U.S, had severe consequences for the OECD countries.  A question
arises as to whether these low interest rates by European Central Banks were influenced by
the decisions of the U.S. or whether the low interest rates were due to the interdependence
between central banks that caused global short rates to be lower than what they otherwise
might  have been (Taylor,  2008).  According to Taylor  (2008),  the financial  crisis  became
severe in August 2007, when the money market interest rates rose significantly. The sharp
reduction in Central Bank rates in response to the crisis further contributed to the widening of
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the spreads in the period after the crisis. The number of bank failures in many OECD nations
skyrocketed during this period; for example, Colonial Bank, Guaranty Bank, Cal National
Bank (U.S), Lloyds (UK), Landsbanki, Glitnir (Iceland), to name a few. In Ireland, one of its
three largest banks, Anglo Irish Bank, was nationalized, and the other two, Allied Irish Bank
and Bank of Ireland were re-capitalized. In response to this, banks tightened lending rates and
restricted lending which also contributed to the widening of the spreads in the same period.
Similar arguments were put forward by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) with regard to the
Great  Depression  of  the  1930s.  They  attributed  the  depression  to  both  contractionary
monetary shocks and banking panics. However, the movement of the nominal interest rates
following the depression was downward.
           While prior studies have investigated the efficiency of the financial  system by
focusing on net interest margins (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999, Drakos 2003, Kasman
et al. 2010), very few studies have been undertaken on interest rate spreads. Agapova and
McNulty (2016) in a study of the relationship between interest  rate margins and banking
efficiency, argue that net interest margins may not be the best measure of the efficiency of a
banking system because it is an ex-post measure, rather than an ex-ante measure. Moreover,
net interest margins are affected by both the asset and the liability composition of banks, as
well as the volume of non-performing loans (Agapova and McNulty, 2016). Therefore, for
empirical purposes this study focuses on interest rate spreads.
           While there is a large literature on factors that can trigger a financial crisis, such as
business cycles (Mitchell 1941), banking panics (Friedman and Schwartz (1963), falling asset
prices,  failures  of  financial  and  non-financial  firms  and  deflations  (Minsky,  1972;
Kindleberger,  1978),  lack  of  liquidity  (Alan  and  Carletti,  2008),  and  capital  mobility
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008), there is hardly any literature on how exactly a crisis affects
interest  rate  spreads.  According  to  theoretical  arguments,  credit  spreads  usually  increase
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during  financial  crises,  because  such  crises  are  associated  with  higher  default  rates  and
greater risk premia (Demirguc–Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). There is also a literature which
examines the effect of various variables on interest rate spreads (Brock and Rojas Suarez,
2000;  Fuentes  and  Basch,  1997;  Barajas,  1999;  Hanson  and  De  Resende  Rocha,  1986;
Hanweck and Ryu, 2005). However, the emphasis of the studies by Brock and Rojas Suarez
(2000),  Fuentes  and Basch (1997) and Barajas  (1999) has been on banks from the Latin
American region1. Ho and Saunders (1981) present a theoretical model of bank spreads in
which a bank would always have an interest  spread due to transactions uncertainty.  They
highlight that the spread is a function of the degree of managerial risk aversion, the size of
transactions undertaken by the bank, the bank market structure, and the variability of interest
rates.  A number  of extensions  have been made to  the Ho-Saunders model.  Allen (1988)
extends the Ho and Saunders model to incorporate loan heterogeneity, while Angbazo (1997)
incorporates the effect of management efficiency. Following from the above discussion, this
paper investigates the following question:
Are the factors that influenced interest rate spreads prior to the crisis the same as those that
affected these spreads after the crisis? 
After the financial crisis, reducing the spread became a major objective of monetary policy.
Investigating the factors that influence interest rate spreads is important because these spreads
affect not only the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, but also the cost of loans.
Answering this question, therefore, is important for policy makers in order to take appropriate
action to minimize the spread in the event of a future crisis, as the cost of rescuing banks can
1 Friedman and Kuttner (1998) find that movements in the interest rate spread in the years just prior to the1990-
1991 recession was influenced by changes in the  quantities of commercial paper, bank CDs, and Treasury bills 
that were not related to the business cycle. Hanweck and Ryu (2005) find that for most banks changes in net 
interest are sensitive to credit, the interest-rate, and term-structure shocks but to different degrees.  Bernanke 
(1990) investigates the predictive power of spreads.
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be very high. Many central banks in the developed world have emphasized an enhanced role
for regulation after the financial crisis. 
          We also use robustness checks to explore the validity of the baseline findings in a
number of ways: investigating the before and after the financial crisis period, adding more
control variables to capture a range of possible alternative venues of influences on interest
rate  spreads,  employing  different  estimation  methodologies,  including  the  system  GMM
methodology that corrects  for any potential  endogeneity bias, as well as Pesaran’s (2006)
estimation methodology with a multifactor error structure, where the unobserved common
factors are correlated with exogenously given individual-specific regressors, and where factor
loadings  change over  the  cross  section  units. Moreover,  given the uncertainty  and likely
measurement errors in interest rate spreads, the robustness of the results are also tested using
the net interest margin (NIM) as an additional measure. The financial crisis also highlighted
that agency problems could undermine the soundness of the banking system, leading to weak
governance systems which, in turn, can lead to excessive risk taking and fraudulent practices
in the banking system (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008).  The importance of agency costs
when there is a separation between ownership and control were first highlighted by Jensen
(1976) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their findings were subsequently supported by Ang
et al. (2000), among others, who found that agency costs increased when a company was
managed by an outsider. As agency costs could increase in a crisis environment due to higher
risk taking, we also investigate, as part of the robustness checks, how agency costs could
affect  interest  rate  spreads.  Following Doukas et  al.  (2005),  McKnight  and Weir  (2009),
Mensah and Abor (2014), and Belghitara and Clark (2015), agency costs in the present study
are first measured as the audit  fees plus directors'  fees (agency cost) expressed over total
assets of the bank (agency). In other words, the employed definition of agency costs focuses
on the managerial actions associated with the banks’ performance. According to Jensen and
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Meckling  (1976),  auditors  are  agents  of  the  shareholders  whose  interests  are  considered
different  from  those  of  the  managers  of  the  companies  audited.  Finally,  the  robustness
analysis additionally attempts to capture the regulatory environment by using the measure of
bank reserve requirements and rule of law (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1997).  The
data  span the  period 1990-2015.  The results  suggest  that  after  the financial  crisis,  bank-
specific factors have played a more important role in determining interest rate spreads in the
OECD countries under study. 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  data  and
methodology, while Section 3 evaluates the empirical results. Section 4 provides a number of
robustness checks and, finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
The data comprise a balanced panel for 35 OECD countries (the countries can be seen in the
appendix), spanning the period 1990-2015. The dependent variable, interest rate spreads,  is
the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private sector customers minus the interest rate
paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. The deposit rate
is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits, while
the lending rate is the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term financing
needs of the private sector. This rate is normally differentiated, according to creditworthiness
of borrowers and objectives of financing (World Bank, 2016). Data on these spreads are taken
from the Federal  Reserve Bank of  St.  Louis,  the World Development  Indicators  and the
European Central Bank Statistical Warehouse. As a robustness check, the analysis also uses
the net interest margin (NIM), interest income minus interest expenses scaled over total assets
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(Garza-García, 2010) as a proxy for interest rate spreads. The NIM is also a good standard
measure of the profitability of a bank’s essential business. 
       A number of independent variables to capture banking sector soundness are also included
in the empirical analysis: the bank capital to asset ratio (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998;
Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000; Entrop et al., 2012; Navajas and Thegeya, 2013), bank non-
performing loans to total gross loans (Barajas et al., 1999), and liquid assets to total assets
(Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000). The last variables proxy liquidity risk, since a bank with
higher liquidity faces lower liquidity risk and is likely to be associated with lower spreads
due to a lower liquidity premium charged on its loans. Banks with high risk usually borrow
emergency funds at high costs and thus charge a liquidity premium, leading to higher spreads
(Ahokpossi, 2013). Furthermore, a weak macro-economic environment could lead to higher
systemic risk. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) argue that low GDP growth and high
inflation, all increase the probability of systemic risk. Gambacorta (2004) argues that changes
in monetary policy can additionally affect both deposit and lending rates through the interest
rate,  bank lending and bank capital  channels.  In  the  case  of  monetary  policy  tightening,
policy rates  rise and, thus,  short-term interest  rates  make it  more costly for banks to  get
sufficient funding; in that sense, they pass these costs onto borrowers through higher lending
rates.  The  bank  lending  channel  works  through  the  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection
mechanisms; hence, following a monetary tightening, interest rates increase and banks attract
more risky customers, so as in order to compensate for the higher risk they increase their
lending rates. In other words, the presence of certain frictions in the financial markets make
internal and external sources of finance not to be perfect substitutes of each other (in contrast
with the theory by Modigliani-Miller), but there is a gap between the costs of internal (e.g.,
retained earnings) and external financing (e.g., issuing equity or debt), which is called the
external finance premium. Monetary policy can influence the external finance premium in a
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manner that monetary tightening increases and monetary loosening decreases its magnitude.
Due to this additional effect of monetary policy on the external finance premium, the impact
of monetary policy on the cost of borrowing may be amplified (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
According to this approach, banks may decide to smooth or not their interest rates, hereby
reducing or enhancing the effect of monetary policy. Adverse selection and moral hazard
problems may induce banks to increase their loan interest rates at a smaller or larger extent
than the rise in their  cost of funding due to monetary tightening. Hence, it  is ambiguous
whether  the banking system amplifies  or  weakens the functioning of  monetary policy.  It
depends on which mechanism dominates in the economy. The net effect of the banking sector
depends on certain characteristics of the banking system (i.e., the degree of competition, easy
access to external financing of firms and banks, etc), as well as on certain characteristics of
the economy (i.e., the distribution of good and risky borrowers and the relevance of adverse
selection behaviour).
Both the rate of inflation, measured by the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP
growth rate are also used in the analysis, while the risk premium on lending, as measured by
the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private sector customers minus the ‘risk free’
treasury bill interest rate at which short-term government securities are issued or traded in the
market, is also used. In some countries interest rate spreads may be negative, indicating that
the market considers its best corporate clients to be at lower risk than the government. Claims
on central governments include loans to central government institutions, net of deposits. The
data are on an aggregate country basis and are obtained from the Orbisbank (ex Bankscope)
dataset. 
       The financial crisis illustrated that agency problems could undermine the stability of the
banking system resulting from weak governance systems which favour excessive risk taking
and fraudulent practices in the banking system (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Hence, the
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analysis also incorporates a variable for agency costs, measured as audit fees plus directors'
fees (agency costs), expressed over total assets of the bank, as part of a robustness check. The
relevant data are also obtained from the Orbis dataset. A higher ratio indicates that managers
achieve their personal goals at the expense of the goals of the investors. In order to maintain
the soundness of the banking system, banks are required to maintain a certain reserve ratio.
Finally, in order to capture the regulatory environment, the analysis initially employs bank
reserve requirements as a further robustness check. The opportunity cost of holding reserves
is that a bank can otherwise earn a profit by lending these funds out (Mishkin and Eakins,
2012). We also use the rule of law as an independent variable as it is found to affect banking
sector efficiency ((La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1997). These data are obtained from
Bloomberg. Table 1 provides a number of descriptive statistics.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
2.2 Methodology
First,  two  second-generation  panel  unit  root  tests  are  employed  to  determine  the
degree of integration in the respective variables. The Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test does
not  require  the  estimation  of  factor  loading  to  eliminate  cross-sectional  dependence.
Specifically, the usual ADF regression yields (Pesaran, 2007):
Δyit = ai + bi yi,t-1 + uit
where, yit is the observation on the ith cross-section unit at time t and uit denotes the error
term,  which has the single-factor structure:  uit =  γi  ft +  εit,  in which ft is  the unobserved
common effect, and εit is the individual-specific (idiosyncratic) error. This ADF regression
has been augmented to include the lagged cross-sectional mean and its first  difference to
capture the cross-sectional dependence that arises through a single-factor model:  
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                      _             _
Δyit = ai + bi yi,t-1 + ci yt-1 + di Δyt + εit
with a bar above a variable denoting its mean value. The null hypothesis is a unit root for the
Pesaran (2007) test.  Moreover,  the bootstrap panel  unit  root  tests  by Smith  et  al.  (2004)
utilize  a  sieve  sampling  scheme  to  account  for  both  the  time  series  and  cross-sectional
dependence in the data through bootstrap blocks. All four tests by Smith et al. (2004) are
constructed with a unit root under the null hypothesis and heterogeneous autoregressive roots
under the alternative hypothesis. The results of these panel unit root tests, reported in Table 2,
support of the presence of a unit root across all variables under consideration, except in the
cases of spreads and the risk premium on lending.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
       The empirical analysis is carried out through the panel GMM approach. The following
model is applied:
spreadsit = αi + β xit’ + εit
where xit is  a  k-dimensional  vector  of  explanatory  variables,  while  αi captures  effects  of
factors associated with the ith bank and that are constant overtime. In the fixed effects model,
αi represents fixed parameters. The GMM methodology avoids potential endogeneity and is
based on the approach recommended by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998).  The  Hansen  test  for  overidentification  can  be  used  to  check  the  validity  of
instruments, while a two-step system GMM provides more efficient estimators over one-step
system GMM. Moreover, two-step GMM gives robust Hansen J-test for over-identification. 
 A Lagrange Multiplier (LM) panel unit root test developed by Im et al. (2005) is also
used to test for a structural break. Lee and Strazicich (2003), suggested a panel LM t-statistic.
Lee and Strazicich’s model can be recalled as follows:
11
Δyit = γi’ΔΖit + δi Ŝi(t-1) + εit
where Δ is the first difference operator, Ŝi(t-1) is the detrended variable of Yit, and εit denotes an
error term. The t-statistic (denoted t*) for the null hypothesis H0:  δi=0 can be calculated for
each unit in order to compute the following LM test statistic:
             N
t* = 1/N Σti*
             i=1
This in turn can be used to determine the following standardized panel LM test statistic:
LM(ṯ) = [√N(ṯ-E(ṯ)] / [√V(ṯ)]
where E(ṯ) and V(ṯ) are tabulated by Im et al. (2005). The results reported in Table 4 are
based on the break date identified by this test which is 2008.
            As part of the robustness check procedure, the analysis also makes use of the
Persaran’s (2006) estimation methodology for heterogenous panels with a multifactor error
structure. This methodology allows for the estimation of panel data models with a multifactor
error  structure,  where  the  unobserved  common  factors  are  (possibly)  correlated  with
exogenously given individual-specific regressors, while the factor loadings change over the
cross section units. This methodology permits filtering the individual-specific regressors by
weighted cross-section aggregates, such that asymptotically, as the cross-section dimension
(N) goes to infinity, the differential effects of unobserved common factors are removed. This
procedure has the advantage of being estimated by OLS applied to an auxiliary regression
where the observed regressors are weighted by cross sectional  averages of the dependent
variable and the individual specific regressors (Pesaran, 2006). 
3. Empirical results
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Table  3  reports  the  preliminary  results  using  the  two-step  system  GMM  methodology.
Column  one  reports  results  without  the  macroeconomic  variables,  while  column  two
illustrates results with the inclusion of these variables. Capital  adequacy exerts a negative
effect on interest rate spreads, indicating that higher bank growth levels are achieved with
lower lending rates, while the banks could potentially possess additional sources of financing
that increase credit activity, as well as reducing the price of loans. Higher liquid assets have a
negative  effect  on spreads,  indicating  that  banks  are  likely  to  receive  lower interest  rate
income,  which  leads  to  lower  spreads,  given  that  their  deposit  markets  are  sufficiently
competitive (Bikker, 2003). The positive and significant coefficient on non-performing loans
highlight that a higher volume of non-performing loans lead to wider interest rate spreads. A
higher volume of non-performing loans would require higher lending rates to make up for
losses,  leading  to  greater  risks  in  lending.  Barajas  et  al.  (1999)  similarly  find  that
nonperforming  loans  play  a  significant  role  in  contributing  to  the  widening  of  interest
spreads, suggesting that banks need to set aside additional resources to cope with bad loan
problems. The relationship between spreads and the risk premium on lending is  positive,
which is explained by the banks’ attempts to maintain profit margins, when probably faced
with  high  levels  of  non-performing  loans  which  could  be  attributed  to  tighter  monetary
conditions. In other words, bad debt provisions, associated with rising credit risks, indicate
that  banks  keep  lending  rates  high  as  they  charge  higher  risk  premia  to  maintain  their
profitability. The results seem to support the relevant arguments put forward by Kashyap and
Stein (2000) and Aspachs et al. (2005). Finally, in terms of the macroeconomic variables,
GDP growth exerts a negative impact on spreads, indicating that more favourable economic
conditions lower the probability of default and raise the value of the collateral,  leading to
reduced lending rates. Moreover, higher inflation cause banks to increase their interest rates
to maintain the real value of their profit margins, while higher inflation is often an indicator
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of enhanced economic uncertainty, for which the banks seek compensation via higher spreads
(Hanson and de Rezende Rocha, 1986).
All the relevant diagnostics are reported in the bottom part of Table 3. For the validity
of the instruments, the results need to reject the test for second-order autocorrelation, AR(2)
in disturbances. Moreover, they need to reject the null hypothesis of difference-in-Hansen
tests  of  the  exogeneity  of  instruments.  It  is  evident  that  both  the  test  for  AR(2)  of
disturbances and the difference-in-Hansen tests fail to reject the respective nulls. Thus, these
tests  support  the validity  of the instruments  used,  while  difference-in-Hansen tests  imply
exogeneity  of our instruments.  The table  also reports  the Hansen test  for overidentifying
restrictions.  In  the  estimation  process,  24  instruments  have  been  used  in  the  two
specifications. These instruments were generated as we use two lags for levels and three lags
for difference in the regressors. As the number of instruments was by far lower than the
number  of  observations,  it  did  not  create  any  identification  problem as  reflected  in  the
Hansen test. 
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In the following step, the analysis repeats the estimation methodology by splitting the sample
at 2008, the year that signified the beginning of the financial  crisis. According to Borrio
(2009), this financial crisis event exacerbated any potential weaknesses on the asset side of
banks’  balance  sheets,  which  triggered  certain  funding  problems.  Such  strains  exposed
growing  problems  in  the  quality  of  the  underlying  assets  leading  to  asset  sales,  which
accelerated declines in asset prices and resulted in further balance sheet pressures. This in
turn,  fed  on  imbalances  in  bank  funding  structures  such  as  excessive  recourse  to  debt
financing,  reflected  in  high  degrees  of  leverage.  Such  characteristics  led  to  severe
14
dislocations in bank funding, large off-balance sheet exposures and high interest rate spreads
(Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Karim et al., 2012). 
This  part  of  the  empirical  analysis  suggests  the  employment  of  the  Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) panel unit root test developed by Im et al. (2005). Based on a univariate LM
statistic, Lee and Strazicich (2003), suggested a panel LM t-statistic, as explained above in
the Data section. The results are reported in Table 4. The LM test documents that there is one
significant break date, i.e. at 2008. 
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Finally,  the split estimates are reported in Table 5 with the results including all  variables
being  reported.  The  findings  with  respect  to  the  bank-related  variables  document  an
interesting picture. In particular, the bank capital ratio retains its sign over both regimes, but
it is significantly stronger over the period after the crisis. A similar picture is emerging in
relevance to the non-performing loans ratio, i.e. it is statistically insignificant over the period
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, while it turned strongly significant (at the 1% level) over the
period after the crisis, as well as in relevance to the risk premium on lending, which was
statistically significant at the 10% level prior to the financial crisis regime and turned out to
be strongly significant (at the 1% level) in the period after the crisis. In terms of the liquidity
ratio, the significance remained strong over both regimes, while a similar picture emerged
with respect to both macroeconomic variables, i.e. inflation and GDP growth. The statistical
significance of the equality of all coefficients across the two regimes clearly highlights the
differential  impact  of  all  coefficients  on  interest  rate  spreads  between  the  two  periods
examined. Overall, the results illustrate that mainly bank-specific factors seem to play a more
important role in determining interest rate spreads across OECD countries, mainly after the
2008 crisis period. Such findings clearly provide evidence that the banking sector, especially
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with respect to lending activities, has turned into a more uncertain environment as this is
reflected on the higher sensitivity of such spreads to its determinants.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
4. Robustness checks
4.1. A different definition of interest rate spreads
The first part of the robustness analysis makes use of the net interest rate margin, that is,
interest  income minus the interest expenses scaled over total  assets (NIM) (Garza-García,
2010).  The NIM is measured by the ex-post  approach and is  viewed as a good standard
measure of the profitability  of banks’ essential  business. A higher margin could mean an
exceptional management across banks in the same form of business, while lower margins
suggest a very low deposit rate and higher costs of borrowing.
The new split estimates are reported in Table 6. The new findings illustrate a similar
picture to that presented in Table 5. In particular, both the bank capital ratio and the non-
performing loans ratio are stronger and statistically significant over the period after the 2008
financial  crisis.  A similar  picture  is  also  described  with  respect  to  the  risk  premium on
lending, which turns to be statistically significant at the 1% level in the period after the crisis.
In terms of the liquidity ratio, the significance remains strong over both regimes, while this is
also  true  for  both  macroeconomic  variables,  i.e.  inflation  and GDP growth,  Overall,  the
results illustrate that regardless of the definition of interest-rate spreads, the bank-specific
drivers  play  a  more  significant  role  in  determining  interest  rate  spreads  across  OECD
countries after the 2008 crisis. Finally, statistical testing on the equality of all coefficients
across the two regimes confirms again the differential impact of all coefficients on interest
rate spreads between the two periods under study.
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[Insert Table 6 about here]
4.2. A different methodological approach
In the presence of cross-section error dependence,  conventional  panel estimation methods
could lead to inconsistent estimates and incorrect inferences. In our framework, this issue is
of great importance because cross-section dependencies are likely to be present for a variety
of reasons, such as omitted common factors (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). In order to take into
account the cross-sectional dependence,  this part of the robustness checks implements the
novel econometric methodology suggested by Pesaran (2006). 
         The new results (based on the interest-rate spreads measured as the difference
between deposit and lending rates) are reported in Table 7, across both the financial crisis
regimes and they document the presence of a similar picture to that reported in Table 5. Once
again, the role of the 2008 financial crisis is catalytic in exemplifying the role of the banking
specific  variables  in  determining interest  rate  spreads,  primarily  over the period after  the
crisis  event,  given that  statistically  the null  hypothesis  on the equality  of  all  coefficients
across the two regimes is rejected.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
4.3. The role of agency costs
According to the agency problem, there is clear evidence on the separation of ownership and
management, which indicates that the interests of shareholders and management are not in
tandem (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1976; Jensen and Meckling 1976). More specifically, managers
are concerned with their job security and avoid risk-taking (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992)
since  they  are  unable  to  nature  their  unemployment  risk.  By contrast,  shareholders  have
larger  incentives  and  are  able  to  diversify  their  risk  by  having  a  number  of  portfolios
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). To minimize the impact of the agency problem, there is the need
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for  shareholders  to  monitor  the  activities  of  the  managers  (Mensah  and  Abor,  2014).
Especially after the recent financial crisis, the role of the stability of the banking system in
the process of economic growth across the globe has been further appreciated. As a part of
this stability target, the role of the agency problem seems to have gained further significance.
This happens because agency problems could lead to weak governance systems that primarily
favour excessive risks taking, disregard rules of prudent lending, and adopt insider abuses
and fraudulent practices in the banking systems. These problems seem to be exacerbated by
issues in relevance to the presence of asymmetric information (De Andres and Vallelado,
2008). Therefore, this part of the empirical analysis explores any potential impact of agency
cost  metrics  on bank interest  rate  spreads  across  our  OECD country  sample.  Given that
managerial (agency) costs come with a cost to the owners, this could potentially explain why
there is the likelihood of reduction in the residual value accrued to shareholders (owners).
Therefore, in trying to minimize the agency problem, there is the need for these shareholders
to monitor  the works of the managers,  thereby,  spending money through this  monitoring
(Mensah and Abor, 2014), which could lead to higher interest rate spreads. In other words, a
positive sign is expected out of the estimation procedure. 
Given  data  availability,  the  agency  cost  variable  is  measured  as  audit  fees  plus
directors' fees (agency cost) expressed over total assets of the bank (Agency). The data in the
numerator are obtained from the Orbis (ex Bankscope) dataset. A higher ratio is an indication
that managers, in achieving their personal goals, tend to neglect the goals of the investors.
This  is  a  symptom of  agency  problems,  since  shareholders  expect  wealth  maximization.
Mensah and Abor (2014) indicate  that  this  variable  impacts  banks'  spreads  in  a  positive
manner. The new results are reported in Table 8. They clearly illustrate not only the positive
impact  of  the  agency  costs  variable  on  interest-rate  spreads,  potentially  due  to  a  more
stressful banking environment, but also that the role of the bank-specific variables turns out
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again  to  be  highly  stronger  after  the  2008 financial  crisis,  thus,  providing further  robust
support to the findings presented in Table 5.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Table  8a  repeats  the  estimates  reported  in  Table  8,  but  this  time  following  the
recommendation by a referee and the approach recommended by Mensah and Abon (2014),
the agency costs variable  is expressed in terms of the number of non-executive directors
scaled over the total board size. According to De Andres et al. (2005), the board size has to
be a mixture  between the characteristics  of a large board,  knowledge and resources,  and
effective communication and coordination that characterizes smaller boards. The aspect of
independent directors is particular important in the agency theory, because it assumes that
being outside of the organization makes sure that there is no other conflict of interest between
the  agent  and  the  principal,  which  increases  the  likelihood  of  corrective  actions.  It  is,
therefore,  expected a negative relationship between this variable and interest rate spreads.
The results  confirm the negative  impact  of  the  alternative  definition  of  the agency costs
variable  on  interest-rate  spreads,  despite  the  presence  of a  more  stressful  banking
environment, indicating that the presence of this environment has not weakened the role of
outside members of the board in forming the risk profile of banks. At the same time, the
bank-specific  variables  retain  their  stronger  role  after  the  2008  financial  crisis,  thus,
providing more robust support to the findings presented in Table 5.
[Insert Table 8a about here]
4.4. The role of the regulatory environment
In this  final  part  of  the robustness  checks section,  we attempt  to  explore the  role  of the
regulatory environment prior to and after the 2008 crisis. In general, banks maintain a certain
percentage of their deposits with the Central  Bank and in that respect they charge higher
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margins as compensation (Maudos and De Guevara, 2004). Though these reserves are used
by the central banks to safeguard the soundness of the banking system, they tend to reduce
the potential revenues the banks could enjoy, which is an extra cost to them (Grenade, 2007).
As a response, banks can pass this cost to their customers in two ways: (i) by giving lower
deposit rates, and (ii) by charging higher lending rates. This is expected to widen the interest
spreads.  Poghosyan  (2012)  assesses  the  impact  of  regulatory  (among  others)  factors  on
interest-rate spreads for the case of low-income countries. His findings highlight that bank
capitalization substantially account for the variation in interest spreads, where lower bank
capitalization leads to higher spreads. 
To the empirical needs of this part of the analysis, we employ a regulatory variable
measured as bank reserve requirements (Reserves). This variable is measured as the reserves
of  banks  with  the  central  banks  scaled  over  total  assets,  with  data  being  obtained  from
Bloomberg. This measure is used as a fiscal policy instrument to support the soundness of the
banking system, albeit it is considered as a cost driver for banks. Maudos and De Guevara
(2004) and Maudos and Solís (2009) provide supporting evidence that reserve requirements
represent  an opportunity cost  to the banks,  and therefore,  they increase their  profitability
margins, while Mensah and Abor (2014) also confirm their results. It is, therefore, expected
that  an increase in banks’ reserves requirements  will  lead to  higher  interest  rate  spreads.
These findings are reported in Table 9 and they document that higher reserves lead to higher
interest spreads. Although the association is positive and statistically significant, the effect
turns out to be stronger over the period after the 2008 crisis.  The remaining explanatory
drivers display the same picture as that presented in Table 5, with statistical testing on the
equality of all coefficients across the two regimes confirming the differential impact of all
coefficients on interest rate spreads across the two regimes under study.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
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Finally, following the reviewer’s recommendation, the analysis repeats the estimates
reported in Table 9, by measuring the regulatory measures as the Rules of Law (LAW). A
number of studies find that legal institutions have a strong influence on banking environment,
especially in relevance to their risk-taking behaviour (Cole and Turk, 2013; Houston et al.,
2010). To consider this definition, we follow the recommendation by La Porta et al. (1997,
1998), Levine (1997) and the above references and we include the Rule of Law variable into
the estimated regression as a proxy of the regulatory framework. The Rule of Law measures
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, the quality of
contract enforcements, the police, and the courts and the likelihood of crime and violence. In
this case, a negative effect of the LAW variable on interest rate spreads is expected. Data on
the Rules of Law were obtained both from Kaufmann et al.  (2011) and the World Bank
database, while Table 10 reports these new estimates. They highlight that a safer regulatory
environment leads to lower interest spreads. However, this negative effect on interest rate
spreads turns out to be weaker over the period after the 2008 crisis. Finally, the remaining
explanatory  drivers  display  the  same picture  as  that  reported  in  Table  9,  with  statistical
testing on the equality of all coefficients across the two regimes rejecting the null hypothesis
of the homogeneous impact of all coefficients on interest rate spreads across the two regimes
under study.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
5. Conclusion and policy implications
This study attempts to understand the drivers of interest rate spreads before and after the 2008
financial crisis. A large literature documents the importance of a well-functioning financial
sector for economic growth. This was evidenced by the financial crisis and its impact on the
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global economy. The findings of this study could have important implications for interest rate
spreads and, more generally, for the implementation of monetary policy, especially during
stressful banking environments. The findings demonstrate the strong interconnection between
the 2008 financial  crises and bank interest  rate  spreads across banks in OECD countries.
More specifically, the results indicate that in the period after the crisis, interest rate spreads
became more sensitive to their determinants. These findings survive a number of robustness
checks.
           The results suggest that credit risk has been better priced into spreads after the crisis.
After the financial crisis, regulators have paid greater attention to the risk profile of banking
institutions, while these institutions themselves have been encouraged to pay greater attention
to  their  risk  management  activities.  As  a  response,  a  number  of  measures  have  been
introduced  to  minimize  credit  risk  through  screening,  monitoring,  long-term  customer
relations,  higher  capital  adequacy  requirements,  better  liquidity  provisions  and collateral,
among other measures (Mishkin and Eakins, 2012). The finding that spreads turn out to be
more sensitive to their drivers in the period after the crisis are potentially due to the increased
transparency brought about by tighter regulations which have led both banks and investors to
reach better credit decisions. The lesson at the end of the day is that banks’ business models
should be adequately based on more stable sources of funding, such as retail deposits, longer-
term funding and, most importantly, equity. In addition, the findings exemplify a potential
role for monetary authorities  to improve macroeconomic stability that reduces uncertainty,
adopt an institutional  framework that strengthen bank balance sheets via more aggressive
debt  collections,  writing  off  non-performing  assets,  eliminating  connected  and  directed
lending, better regulation and supervision, increasing competition across banking institutions,
and improving economic institutions, particularly, ensuring clear property rights, appropriate
collateral regimes, compilation of credit history, and strong contract enforcement.
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Potential  venues  for  future  research  involve  the  employment  of  a  bank-based
disaggregated analysis that could potentially include the role of the size of the banks, and
whether  interest  rate  spreads  differ  between  private  and  state-owned  banks.  Finally,  the
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
___________________________________________________________________________
Variable Mean   S.D.   Min    Max         Jarque-Bera
___________________________________________________________________________
Spread 4.592 18.339 -1.372 541.631 [0.000]
Bank capital to
asset ratio 6.922   2.488  2.400   24.000 [0.000]
Non-performing
loans to total
gross loans 4.501   5.256  0.082   34.672 [0.000]
Liquid assets to
total assets           30.784 18.284  0.000 151.950 [0.000]
Risk premium
on lending 3.262   2.117 -1.607   15.578 [0.000]
NIM 1.458   2.416  0.613     2.157 [0.000]
Agency 0.219   0.484  0.128     0.284 [0.000] 
Reserves 0.064   0.025  0.051     0.069 [0.000]
log(cpi)           1.887   0.267 -1.173     2.165 [0.001]
 
log(gdp)           11.557   0.678  7.878   13.219 [0.000]
___________________________________________________________________________
Notes: The Jarque-Bera test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.
Figures in brackets denote p-values.
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Table 2. Panel unit root tests
Variable








spreads -5.22*** -5.36*** -5.20*** 23.15*** -6.61*** 6.34***
Bank capital
to assets ratio
-1.28  -1.37  -1.29 2.91  -1.49  1.28
ΔBank capital
to assets ratio


















-5.41*** -5.60*** -6.83*** 23.19*** -7.62*** 7.88***
Risk premium
on lending
-5.72*** -5.91*** -6.94*** 22.27*** -7.58*** -7.81***
NIM -1.34 -1.42 -1.33 2.84 -1.35 1.39
ΔNIM -5.43*** -5.72*** -5.61*** 21.97*** -6.94*** 6.84***
log(cpi) -1.30 -1.39 -1.28 2.66 -1.39 1.42
Δlog(cpi) -5.61*** -5.84*** -6.49*** 21.48*** -7.28*** 7.51***
log(gdp) -1.25 -1.34 -1.29 2.55 -1.32 1.44
Δlog(gdp) -5.53*** -5.62*** -6.22*** 20.82*** -7.29*** 7.50***
Agency -5.98*** -6.37*** -6.18*** 22.36*** -7.03*** 7.41***
Reserves -1.31 -1.39 -1.35 2.91 -1.37 1.39
ΔReserves -6.11*** -6.42*** -6.31*** 22.57*** -6.91*** 7.24***
Δ denotes first differences. A constant is included in the Pesaran (2007) tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis
indicates stationarity in at least one country. CIPS* = truncated CIPS test. Both a constant and a time trend are
included in the Smith et al. (2004) tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one
country.  For both tests the results are reported at lag = 4. The null hypothesis is that of a unit root. ***: p≤0.01.
Table 3. Spreads (GMM) estimates: full sample period
___________________________________________________________________________
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Variables     (1)     (2)
___________________________________________________________________________
Constant -0.074** -0.063**
 [0.04]  [0.05]
Spreads(-1)   0.233***  0.218***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
ΔBank capital to  
asset ratio -0.089*** -0.077***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
ΔBank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.064*** -0.061***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
ΔNon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.066***  0.058***
  [0.00]  [0.00]
ΔNon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.050***  0.036***
  [0.00]  [0.00]
ΔNon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-2)   0.029**  0.020**
  [0.03]  [0.05]
ΔLiquid assets to
total assets -0.061*** -0.057***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
ΔLiquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.041*** -0.036***
 [0.00]  [0.01]
Risk premium
on lending  0.072***  0.060***










R2  0.59  0.68
AR(1)  0.00  0.00
AR(2)  0.38  0.41
Hansen test  0.56  0.59
Difference Hansen test               0.73  0.80
No. Of observations  910  910
___________________________________________________________________________
Notes: AR(1) is the first-order test for residual autocorrelation. AR(2) is the test for autocorrelation of order 2.
Hansen is the test for the overidentification check for the validity of instruments. The difference-in-Hansen test
checks the exogeneity of the instruments. Figures in parentheses denote p-values. **: p≤0.05; ***: p≤0.01. All
estimations were performed with time dummies and coefficients are not reported.
Table 4. Panel unit roots with a break
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___________________________________________________________________________
Variables LM test p-value         Break date
___________________________________________________________________________
Spreads -0.549(2) [0.000] 2008
NIM -0.583(2) [0.000] 2008
Agency -0.552(2) [0.000] 2008
Reserves -0.731(3) [0.000] 2008
Bank capital to
asset ratio -0.601(2) [0.000] 2008
Non-performing
loans to total
gross loans -0.573(3) [0.000] 2008
Liquid assets to
total assets             -0.584(2) [0.000] 2008
Risk premium
on lending -0.562(1) [0.000] 2008
log(cpi)           -0.176(1) [0.136]            2009
log(gdp)             -0.578(2) [0.000]            2008
__________________________________________________________________________
Figures  in  brackets  denote  p-values,  while  those  in  parentheses  are  the  optimal  number  of  lagged  first-
differenced terms included in the unit root test to correct for serial correlation.
Table 5. Spreads (GMM) estimates (prior and after the 2008 crisis): spreads measured as the
difference between deposit and lending rates
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___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007                          2008-2015
__________________________________________________________________________________
constant                -0.088** -0.042**
 [0.02]  [0.05]
spreads(-1)   0.202***  0.247***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.035*              -0.106***
 [0.08]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.010 -0.064***
 [0.23]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.029  0.078***
  [0.18]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.021  0.055***
  [0.30]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-2)   0.013  0.041***
  [0.42]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.052*** -0.063***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.038*** -0.047***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.039*                0.089***
 [0.07]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.041***  0.059***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                 0.033**  0.041**
 [0.03]  [0.02]
Δgdp -0.041*** -0.097***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.030**                -0.071***
 [0.03]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.62  0.73
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.33]  [0.53]
Hansen test  [0.49]  [0.57]
Difference Hansen test                  [0.62]  [0.74]
Zbank capital to asset ratio          [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans            [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets          [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending                          [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp         [0.00]
No. Of observations  630  280
__________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Table 3. Z is the Clogg et al. (1995) test for equality of coefficients across regime periods.
Table  6.  Spreads  (GMM)  estimates  (prior  and  after  the  2008  crisis):  spreads  measured
through net interest margins
36
___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007          2008-2015
__________________________________________________________________________________
constant                -0.069** -0.036**
 [0.03]  [0.05]
NIM(-1)                0.285***  0.338***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.042**                             -0.153***
 [0.05]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.006 -0.082***
 [0.41]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.034  0.089***
  [0.13]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.032  0.070***
  [0.24]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.057*** -0.079***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.043*** -0.058***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.036*                0.095***
 [0.08]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.045***  0.066***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                 0.039**  0.052***
 [0.02]  [0.01]
Δgdp -0.048*** -0.106***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.033**               -0.083***
 [0.02]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.65  0.77
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.31]  [0.57]
Hansen test  [0.52]  [0.60]
Difference Hansen test               [0.61]  [0.69]
Zbank capital to asset ratio          [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans            [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets          [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending          [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp         [0.00]
No. Of observations  630  280
__________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Tables 3 and 5.
Table  7.  Spreads  (Pesaran)  estimates  (prior  and  after  the  2008 crisis):  spreads  measured  as  the difference
between deposit and lending rates
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___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007                          2008-2015
__________________________________________________________________________________
constant               -0.083**               -0.040**
 [0.02]  [0.05]
spreads(-1)   0.211***  0.252***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.039*              -0.110***
 [0.07]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.012 -0.068***
 [0.22]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.026  0.081***
  [0.20]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.024  0.058***
  [0.28]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-2)   0.015  0.044***
  [0.41]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.050*** -0.059***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.036*** -0.046***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.037*                0.086***
 [0.07]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.043***  0.058***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                 0.029**  0.045**
 [0.04]  [0.02]
Δgdp -0.043*** -0.101***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.032**                -0.074***
 [0.03]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.61  0.74
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.31]  [0.51]
Hansen test  [0.51]  [0.54]
Difference Hansen test                   [0.61]  [0.72]
CD statistic   [0.00]  [0.00]
Zbank capital to asset ratio          [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans            [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets          [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending          [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp        [0.00]
No. Of observations  630  280
________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: CD is the Pesaran’s (2004) test for cross independence. The remaining are similar to those in Tables 3 and 5.
Table 8. Spreads (GMM) estimates (prior and after the 2008 crisis): spreads measured as the difference between
deposit and lending rates-The role of agency problem
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___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007                          2008-2015
________________________________________________________________________________
constant                -0.074** -0.036*
 [0.03]  [0.06]
spreads(-1)   0.216***  0.268***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.040*              -0.124***
 [0.06]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.015 -0.078***
 [0.20]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.035  0.094***
  [0.13]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.024  0.069***
  [0.27]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.059*** -0.081***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.044*** -0.059***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.045**                              0.097***
 [0.05]  [0.00]
Agency  0.068*   0.104***
 [0.06]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.045***   0.067***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                 0.038**  0.052***
 [0.02]  [0.01]
Δgdp -0.049*** -0.112***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.039*** -0.082***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.64  0.77
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.35]  [0.59]
Hansen test  [0.54]  [0.61]
Difference Hansen test                 [0.66]  [0.72]
Zbank capital to asset ratio          [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans            [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets          [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending          [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp         [0.00]
Zagency       [0.00]
No. Of observations   630   280
_______________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Tables 3 and 5.
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Table 8a. Spreads (GMM) estimates (prior and after the 2008 crisis): spreads measured as the the difference
between deposit and lending rates, while agency costs are measured as the number of non-executive directors
scaled over the total board size-Robust check on the role of agency problem
___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007          2008-2015
__________________________________________________________________________________
constant              -0.092*** -0.031*
 [0.01]  [0.08]
spreads(-1)   0.187***  0.294***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.036*              -0.158***
 [0.08]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.010 -0.092***
 [0.35]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.031  0.116***
  [0.18]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.019  0.083***
  [0.39]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.044*** -0.097***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.038**                -0.078***
 [0.02]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.039*                0.119***
 [0.07]  [0.00]
Agency -0.049*  -0.138***
 [0.08]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.041***   0.078***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                 0.034**   0.060***
 [0.03]  [0.00]
Δgdp -0.045*** -0.136***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.035*** -0.093***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.60  0.81
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.32]  [0.64]
Hansen test  [0.50]  [0.66]
Difference Hansen test                  [0.59]  [0.78]
Zbank capital to asset ratio           [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans             [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets           [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending           [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp         [0.00]
Zagency           [0.00]
No. Of observations                     630  280
________________________________________________________________________________
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Notes: Similar to those in Tables 3 and 5.
Table 9. Spreads (GMM) estimates (prior and after the 2008 crisis): spreads measured as the difference between
deposit and lending rates-The role of regulatory environment, measured as bank reserves requirements
___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007          2008-2015
__________________________________________________________________________________
constant                -0.068** -0.039*
 [0.04]  [0.06]
spreads(-1)   0.224***  0.276***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.035*              -0.116***
 [0.07]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.021 -0.072***
 [0.18]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.042  0.105***
  [0.12]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.028  0.077***
  [0.25]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.053*** -0.075***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.040*** -0.054***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.039**                              0.083***
 [0.05]  [0.00]
Reserves  0.054*   0.186***
 [0.08]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.042***   0.074***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                  0.035**   0.057***
 [0.02]  [0.00]
Δgdp -0.053*** -0.124***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.042*** -0.089***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.62  0.79
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.31]  [0.53]
Hansen test  [0.58]  [0.69]
Difference Hansen test                [0.58]  [0.64]
Zbank capital to asset ratio          [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans            [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets          [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending          [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp         [0.00]
Zreserves       [0.00]
No. Of observations  630  280
__________________________________________________________________________________
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Notes: Similar to those in Tables 3 and 5.
Table  10.  Spreads  (GMM) estimates  (prior  and  after  the  2008 crisis):  spreads  measured  as  the  difference
between deposit and lending rates-The role of regulatory environment measured as the Rules of Law
___________________________________________________________________________
Variables          1990-2007          2008-2015
__________________________________________________________________________________
constant               -0.049* -0.031*
 [0.06]  [0.09]
spreads(-1)   0.207***  0.299***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio -0.030*              -0.135***
 [0.09]  [0.00]
Δbank capital to  
asset ratio(-1) -0.014 -0.088***
 [0.27]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans   0.034  0.129***
  [0.20]  [0.00]
Δnon-performing
loans to total
gross loans(-1)   0.022  0.092***
  [0.37]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets -0.041**               -0.086***
 [0.02]  [0.00]
Δliquid assets to
total assets(-1) -0.028**                -0.071***
 [0.05]  [0.00]
risk premium
on lending  0.033*                0.096***
 [0.07]  [0.00]
Rules of Law -0.039*  -0.209***
 [0.10]  [0.00]
Δcpi  0.039***   0.082***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Δcpi(-1)                 0.032**   0.068***
 [0.03]  [0.00]
Δgdp -0.046*** -0.129***
 [0.00]  [0.00]
Δgdp(-1) -0.033*** -0.094***
 [0.01]  [0.00]
Diagnostics
R2  0.65  0.81
AR(1)  [0.00]  [0.00]
AR(2)  [0.28]  [0.47]
Hansen test  [0.52]  [0.64]
Difference Hansen test                [0.49]  [0.69]
Zbank capital to asset ratio          [0.00]
ZΔnon-performing loans to
total gross loans            [0.00]
ZΔliquid assets to total assets          [0.00]
Zrisk premium on lending          [0.00]
ZΔcpi         [0.00]
ZΔgdp         [0.00]
ZRules of Law       [0.00]
No. Of observations  630  280
__________________________________________________________________________________
Notes: Similar to those in Tables 3, 5 and 9.
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